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Abstract: Technology firms often decide between being open or closed to third party 
application development. Building on a two-sided market model with competing platforms, 
I show that firms might prefer to restrict third party application development despite the 
fact that allowing it is free and increases the value of the product to consumers. The 
reason is that restricting third party application development removes network effects and 
thereby relaxes competition between platforms. From a social welfare perspective, firms 
sometimes restrict third party application development even though total welfare would be 
higher if development was possible. 
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"Tech firms today are caught in a bind, between being open (to attract 
a community of developers) and closed (to ensure high standards and 
maintain their traditional business models)." The Economist 1
hy are some products open to third party development while others 
are closed? As the quote above underscores, it may be a trade-off 
between having applications that raises the value of the product and 
ensuring a high quality product. I, however, take a two-sided market 
approach underscoring that being open to third party developers can lead to 
intensified competition for consumers. Hence, firms might prefer to restrict 
third party application development despite that allowing it is free and 
increases the value of the product to consumers. 
(*) I am thankful for financial support from the Finnish Doctoral Programme in Economics and 
the Research and Training Foundation of TeliaSonera Finland Oyj. I thank Jay Pil Choi, 
Charlotta Grönqvist, Klaus Kultti, Andras Niedermayer, Tore Nilssen, Lars Sørgard, Rune 
Stenbacka, and participants at the FDPE Microeconomics and IO Workshop in Helsinki and the 
6th ZEW Conference on the Economics of ICT in Mannheim for insightful comments. This paper 
is a shortened combination of the working papers “Open versus Closed Platforms” and 
“Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms” and it is partly written within the Gustaf 
Douglas Research Program on Entrepreneurship at the Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics.
1 The Economist, "Who holds the key?", Aug 15
th 2008 from Economist.com. 
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The choice between allowing and banning third party application 
developers is relevant in a number of markets. For example, operating 
systems for modern personal computers are prime examples of products 
that are open to third party application development. Apple's OS X, 
Microsoft's Windows Vista and various versions of Linux all allow for and 
even encourage application development. The same holds for video game 
consoles. The three large consoles on the market (the Xbox 360, the 
Playstation 3 and the Wii) have third parties developing games for them. 
In some markets, the same firm provides products that both allow for and 
restrict third party development. High-end phones often have an operating 
system that allows for third party applications. The Nokia N95, for example, 
comes with the S60 software permitting users to install software from third 
party application developers. Yet, cheaper mobile phones such as the Nokia 
1600 often restrict third party application development. Interestingly, when 
Apple entered the mobile phone market in June 2007 with the iPhone, third 
party application development was impossible for the phone. Apple, 
however, later reversed this strategy by releasing a software development kit 
for the iPhone in June 2008. 
A related question is if firms allow third parties access to their products 
when it is socially desirable? This has been a concern for antitrust 
authorities. For example, in 1955, the FCC in the United States agreed with 
the AT&T Bell System that an attachment to phones (the Hush-A-Phone) 
that helped reduce noise could not be marketed and sold independently, 
since it was a "foreign attachment" to the AT&T network. The FCC also 
concluded that all telephone equipment should be sold by the network 
operator. However, this decision was overturned on appeal by the D.C. 
Circuit. In line with this appeal, the FCC later (in 1968) ruled that it should be 
possible to use another attachment, the Carterfone, on the AT&T Bell 
System network despite the fact that is was marketed by an independent 
company. 
This paper contributes to the literature on systems, aftermarkets and two-
sided markets by studying the decision to allow or restrict third party 
application development. I start from a standard two-sided market model 
from ARMSTRONG (2006) and I endogenize the choice of allowing one of 
the sides (application developers) to interact with the other (consumers).  J. TÅG  97
Much of the early literature on two-sided markets focuses on solving the 
problem of how much to charge each side 2. Related to comparing one and 
two-sided markets, there has been some work on the difference between 
operating as a merchant versus operating as a platform. According to 
HAGIU (2007), the main difference is that a merchant takes full possession 
of the content, whereas a platform leaves control over the sale to sellers and 
simply intermediates the transaction.  
There is also related work on exclusivity in two-sided markets by HAGIU 
& LEE (2007). In their model, a content provider joins one or both platforms 
depending on whether the content is exclusive or not. In contrast, I compare 
the platforms' choice of whether to allow third parties 3. Finally, this paper is 
also related to the two-sided market literature discussing pay-tv versus free-
to-air (see e.g. ANDERSON & COATE, 2005; PEITZ & VALLETTI, 2008; 
KIND, NILSSEN & SORGARD, 2005). The main contribution to this literature 
is that I consider platform competition with an endogeneous choice between 
being one-sided (pay-tv) and being two-sided (partly or fully advertising 
supported). 
In taking the two-sided market route, my approach differs from the 
aftermarket approach of KENDE (1998) in that I assume away the central 
hold-up problem in the aftermarket literature. Instead, I focus on the ability of 
firms to charge (or subsidize) third parties for the right to develop 
applications for the platform. Adding this dimension, the firms can directly 
profit from selling rights to develop for the platform. They also have the 
ability to subsidize developers to encourage application development.  
This paper differs from the components versus systems approach in 
MATUTES & REGIBEAU (1988), CHURCH & GANDAL (1988) and ARORA 
& BOKHARI (2007) by analyzing atomistic producers of secondary 
components instead of two (or more) components produced by the same (or 
different) firms. I place heavy emphasis on the existence of cross-group 
externalities between consumers and application developers. Further, I 
completely "black box" the pricing decision of application developers. My 
approach has the advantage of emphasizing cross-group externalities and 
2 See for example CAILLAUD & JULLIEN (2003), ROCHET & TIROLE (2003, 2006), HAGIU 
(2006), and ARMSTRONG (2006). 
3 One of the results in HAGIU & LEE (2007) is that firms might want to give up control rights 
over pricing content in order to relax competition. This result is perhaps most closely related to 
this paper as a firm here might want to give up all gains (from consumers and/or from third-
parties) in order to relax competition. 98     No. 74, 2
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pricing to internalize them. The drawback is that I assume away potentially 
important strategic interactions between the price of the product and the 
price of applications set by application developers. 
  The model 
I study a two-stage duopoly model of a two-sided market where firms 
connect consumers with third party application providers. There are two 
firms,  {1, 2} k , each with the same intrinsic value v . The value of any 
applications developed in-house by the firm is also included in v . The 
number of these applications is exogenous and independent of whether the 
firm allows for or restricts third party development. For example, the same 
basic set of applications (such as a calendar, a phone book, an alarm clock, 
a simple game) bundled with high-end phones open to development are also 
often available on low-end phones that do not allow development.  
The firms can be open to third party development, in which case they are 
platforms that connect consumers with application developers, or they can 
be closed to development and simply sell the product of value v  to 
consumers. Firms can also set a fee (or subsidy) for the right to develop an 
application.  
The cost for allowing third party application development is zero. Fixed 
costs are sunk and marginal costs zero. Consumers only buy one product or 
platform, but application developers may develop for any or both of the 
platforms that allow for development. 
Consumers 
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval ( [0,1] x ) with 
the firms,  {1, 2} k , located at the endpoints of the interval. The intrinsic 
value of the products (or platforms), v , is sufficiently large for the market to 
be completely covered. 
In the eyes of consumers, the firms only differ in price and the number of 
applications available. A consumer denoted by i  receives utility  
11 1 () , ii a u v tx bn p                        [1] J. TÅG  99
if buying from firm 1 and utility  
22 2 (( 1) ) , ii a u v t x bn p                      [2] 
if buying from firm 2. The number of applications available are given by  1 a n
and 2 a n . The parameter  0 b !  measures the marginal value to the 
consumer of a third party application. Prices are  1 p  and  2 p . The 
transportation cost parameter, t , measures the intensity of competition 
between firms. Finally, define by  ck n  the number of consumers buying from 
platform k .
Application developers 
The application developers are independent monopolists. They are 
treated as atomistic and are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, 
[0,1] y . Developers are heterogeneous in terms of fixed costs for coming 
up with a business idea, setting up shop and developing an application. An 
application developer indexed by  j y  has fixed costs equal to  j fy  for 
developing an application. Note that to keep the model tractable and 
symmetric, application developers have no initial favored platform to develop 
for and they view platforms as symmetric given the same number of 
consumers using them and the same fee for application development. 
Each application developer is able to extract an expected profit of  0 a !
from each consumer purchasing the platform. These profits are generated 
from sources such as selling advertising space or increased sales from 
complementary products. 
Application developers are allowed to multi-home. This means that they 
may develop applications for both platforms if they both allow for third party 
application development. Then, application developers make the decision to 
develop for one platform independently of the decision to develop for the 
other platform. Thus, there is no direct competition between the firms for 
developers. A firm can attract more developers by either reducing the price 
of the platform, thereby selling to more consumers, or by reducing the fee or 
increasing the subsidy for application development. Application developers 
must pay the fixed development cost twice if they wish to supply an 
application for both platforms. 100     No. 74, 2
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Conditional on the number of consumers at each platform, an application 
developer  j  has profits equal to 
jk ck j k an fy s S                     [3] 
from platform  {1, 2} k . The costs of developing applications are sufficiently 
high to ensure that some developers always stay out of the market. 
Parameter  k s  denotes the fee or subsidy imposed or handed out by the 
platform. If s  is positive, it represents a fee that must be paid for the right to 
develop an application. An example is a fee that must be paid for an 
application development kit needed to create the application. If s  is negative 
it is a subsidy. It can then be any type of action by the firm operating the 
platform that reduces the costs of developing an application, such as 
training, subsidized conferences and free extensive documentation of 
interfaces.
Figure 1 - Platforms can either be open or closed to third party application development 
Timing
In stage 1, firms simultaneously decide whether to be open or closed to 
third party development. Figure 1 illustrates possible outcomes. 
In stage 2, firms observe the choice made by the rival. Then, they 
simultaneously set prices to consumers. Firms allowing third party 
application development also set the fee or subsidy to application 
developers. Consumers and developers then observe prices and the fees or J. TÅG  101
subsidies. They form rational expectations regarding participation of the 
opposite group. Then, consumers buy the platform yielding the highest utility 
and developers decide separately for each platform if they should develop 
for the platform. 
This timing captures the fact that the choice of being open or closed to 
third party application development is more long term than the choice of 
prices and fees (subsidies). It allows firms to commit to allowing 
development or not before setting prices and fees. That consumers and 
application developers make their adoption decisions simultaneously 
captures the fact that they arrive in a sufficiently alternated fashion. I thus 
abstract from situations in which one side clearly arrives before the other. 
The assumption that consumers form rational expectations also implies that 
adoption dynamics such as solving a chicken-and-egg problem (see e.g. 
CAILLAUD & JULLIEN, 2003) are set aside. 
In what follows, I solve this game by backwards induction. I look for pure 
strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. I start by analyzing pricing in the 
second stage of the game. I consider separately all four sub-games outlined 
in Figure 1. Then, I move back to the first stage of the game and analyze the 
choice of being open or closed to third party application development. 
  Analysis 
Stage 2: closed-closed 
When both platforms are closed to development, the setup reduces to the 
standard Hotelling model with firms at both endpoints of the unit interval. For 
the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 or firm 2  
12 (1 ) ii vt x p v x tp                   [4] 
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2's product is  21 1 cc nn   . The firms simultaneously set price to maximize 
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Stage 2: open-open 
The consumer indifferent between purchasing platform 1 and purchasing 
platform 2 is located at the  i x  satisfying  
11 2 2 (1 ) ai a i vb n t x p vb n x tp                    [5] 
Demand for firm 1's platform conditional on the number of applications at 
each platform is then equal to 
12 21 1
1 22 2
aa bn bn pp cond
c tt n
     . Demand for firm 
2's platform conditional on the number of applications at each platform is 
21 1
cond cond
cc nn   . The developer who is indifferent between developing and 
not developing an application for platform k  is located at 
ck k an s
j f y
   .
Demand for developing applications for platform 
ck k an s
j f y
    conditional on 
the number of consumers purchasing each platform is then 
ck k an s cond
ak f n
   .
Simultaneously solve equations  11
cond
cc nn   , 22
cond
cc nn   , 11
cond
aa nn    and 
22
cond
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Given these demand functions, firms simultaneously set prices,  k p , to 
consumers and the fees (subsidies) to application developers,  k s , to 
maximize kOO k ck k ak p ns n S   .J. TÅG  103
Equilibrium prices are   ( 3 )/ 4  and  / 4, kOO kOO pt a a b fs a b
      
and platform profits are 
22 (1/ 2) ( 6 ) /16 kOO ta a b b f S
     . The 
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f















are satisfied for 
2 4( ) 0 ft a b  ! . This is a technical condition required for 






 §· !! ¨¸
©¹
.
It says that the product of the transportation cost and the fixed entry cost 
must be larger than the square of the average of the cross-group 
externalities.
Firms balance the price to consumers with fees (or subsidies) to 
application developers so as to best internalize cross-group externalities. 
Application developers are subsidized if the valuation of applications by 
consumers is sufficiently large in relation to developers' profits from reaching 
an additional consumer (ba ! ). 
As noted by ARMSTRONG (2006), profits from the multi-homing side 
(the application developer side) are competed away on the single-homing 
(consumer) side of the market. The reason is that the competition for 
consumers is intensified when platforms are open to third party application 
development and network effects are present. A cut in the price leads to 
more consumers buying the platform. It also attracts more application 
developers because more consumers have bought the platform. Both 
platforms then have strong incentives to cut price. These incentives are 
increasing in the size of cross-group externalities and decreasing in the 
costs of developing applications (because it becomes easier to attract 
developers). Hence, profits (and prices) are increasing in the costs of 
developing applications and decreasing in the size of the cross-group 
network externalities. Since profits are decreasing in the size of the cross-
group network externalities, firms would like to reduce them. This gives firms 
an incentive to restrict third party application development in stage 1 as it 
removes cross-group externalities. 104     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
Stage 2: open-closed and closed-open 
Assume that firm 1 has the platform with third party application 
development and firm 2 has restricted development and only sells a product. 
The formulas for the reverse case can easily be obtained by renaming the 
firms. 
Conditional on the number of applications developed for platform 1, the 
consumer who is indifferent between platforms is located at the  i x  that 
satisfies  
11 2 (1 ) ai i vb n t x p v x tp       .             [10] 
Demand for firm 1's platform conditional on the number of application 
developers that develop for platform 1 is 
1 21 1
1 22 2
a bn pp cond
c tt n
    . Demand for 
firm 2's product conditional on the number of application developers that 
develop for platform 1 is  21 1
cond cond
cc nn   . The developer who is indifferent 
between developing for platform 1 and not developing is located at 
11 c an s
j f y
   . Demand for developing applications for platform 1 conditional 
on the number of consumers purchasing platform 1 is then 
11
1
c an s cond
a f n
   .
To obtain demands as functions of prices on both sides of the market, 
simultaneously solve equations  11
cond
cc nn   , 22
cond
cc nn    and  11
cond
aa nn   .
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Firm 1 sets the price to consumers and the fee (or subsidy) to application 
developers to maximize  11 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 (, ,) (, ,) . OC c a p n pps s n pps S   Firm 2 
simultaneously sets the price to consumers to maximize 
22 2 1 2 1 (,,) . OC c p np p s S    Equilibrium prices are J. TÅG  105
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Figure 2 - The simultaneous move game played in stage 1 
Platform profits are 
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 !  are 
satisfied for 
2 4( ) 0 ft a b  ! .
By reversing the identities of the platforms, we can get profits under the 
outcome Closed-Open instead of Open-Closed. These profits are 
12 CO OC SS
    and  21 CO OC SS
   . Application developers are subsidized if 
ba ! . The size of cross-group network externalities and the costs of 
developing applications can either increase or decrease profits. The reason 
is that while cross-group externalities increase the value of the platform to 
consumers, they also lead to intensified competition for consumers. 
Stage 1: Open or Closed to Third Party Application Development? 
The firms simultaneously decide if third-parties should be able to develop 
for their platform. By solving the first stage, illustrated in Figure 2, we can 
obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: For sufficiently large differences in cross-group network 
externalities, both firms are open to third party application development. 106     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
They are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma. If the difference in cross-group 
network externalities is sufficiently small, both firms restrict third party 
application development in order to reduce network effects and relax 
competition. For intermediate differences in cross-group network 
externalities, one platform is open to third party application development and 
the other is closed.          
To see this, first assume that it is desirable for firm 1 to allow 
development if firm 2 does not allow development. Then  11 OC CC SS
 !  or 
22
22 2
(8 ( ) )( 3 )
2 (4 1 2 )
ft a b ab ft t
fa a bb f t
 
  ! . Simplifying, using 
2 4( ) 0 ft a b  ! , leads to the 
following condition 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t  ! . Note that this condition 
holds if 
22 60 aa b b  !  or equivalently, if 
2 () 40 ab a b  !  (there is a 
sufficient difference in cross-group externalities). Assuming that 
22 60 aa b b  ! , it is possible to show that  11 OO CO SS
 !  or that 
22 2 2
22 2
86 ( ( ) 6 ) ( 2 )
16 (4 1 2 )
ft a ab b a b ft ft ab
f fa a bb f t
    
  ! . Then firm 1 has a dominant strategy to 
allow for application development. This also holds for firm 2. Hence, the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to be open to third party 
application development. The equilibrium is shown in area 1 in Figure 3. 
Since
22 60 aa b b  ! , it must be that  11 CC OO SS
 !  and the game is a 
prisoner's dilemma. 
Second, now suppose that 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t  ! , but that 
22 60 aa b b    (so  ft  is small). Then,  11 OC CC SS
 !  but it need not be 
that 11 OO CO SS
 ! . If  11 OO CO SS
  , the game has two pure strategy Nash 
equilibria; either firm 1 is open to development and firm 2 is closed or the 
reverse holds. Equilibria of this type must lie in area 3 in Figure 3, but area 3 
also contains parameter combinations resulting in an equilibrium 
characterized by both platforms allowing third party development. 
Third, now assume that it is desirable for firm 1 to restrict application 
development if firm 2 also does so. Then, 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t   
and it is possible to use this to show that  11 CO OO S S
  ! . Firm 1 has a 
dominant strategy to restrict development. This also holds for firm 2 and the 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to restrict application 
development (area 2 in Figure 3).  J. TÅG  107
Figure 3 - Equilibrium regions for  1 f t   
The line from (0,2) to (2,0) corresponds to  2 4( ) 0 ft a b     , the line separating areas 1 and 
3 to  2 () 40 ab a b     and the line separating areas 2 and 3 to the equation 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t    . Varying  f or t  scales the picture. Comparing with Figure 2, 
Region 1 corresponds to the OO outcome, region 2 to the CC outcome and region 3 to the 
outcomes OC, CO or OO. 
The proposition underscores that firms may have a dominant strategy to 
restrict third party application development; this takes place despite the fact 
that allowing development is free and the product increases in value for 
consumers. The reason is that competition is intensified when there are 
network effects between consumers and application developers. All else 
equal, a given price cut to consumers when development is possible attracts 
more new consumers as compared to when development is restricted 
because the price is lower and platform value higher. 
To see this formally, we can examine the best response functions of 
firm  1. The best response functions for price for firm 1 when it restricts 
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 !  in equilibrium, firm 1 
has incentives to price more aggressively if firm 2 is open to application 
development 4. Hence, by restricting third party application development, 
firms are able to reduce the intensity of competition for consumers by 
removing network effects. 
In equilibrium, the effect on profits from allowing third party development 
depends on a balance between benefits from an increase in the value of the 
platform and the possibility to profit from application developers and 
intensified competition for consumers 5.
For a  sufficiently similar to b , both firms have individual incentives to  
restrict third party application development. Allowing development would 
lead to lower profits due to intense competition for consumers. This case is 
represented in area 2 in Figure 3. If a  is much larger than b , acquiring 
additional consumers is very profitable for the firm as the fee for the right to 
develop applications can be substantially increased. Even though 
competition for consumers is intensified with third party application 
developers, the firm finds it profitable to be open to development because 
4 Firm 1 is either more or less aggressive in pricing when allowing application development. If 
ba ! , so that 
1 0 s   in equilibrium, firm 1 is less aggressive in pricing. If ba  , so 
1 0 s !  in 
equilibrium, firm 1 is more aggressive in pricing. 
5 There is a difference between a standard quality increase of the platform and a quality 
increase induced by more application developers developing for the platform. The size of a 
standard quality increase does not depend on price, whereas the quality increase due to more 
application developers depends on prices on both sides of the market. Further, the total profits 
of the platform are the sum of profits from consumers and profits from application developers, 
so that increases in quality brought about through having more application developers have a 
different effect on profits than standard quality increases. J. TÅG  109
selling the rights to develop applications recoups losses from intensified 
competition for consumers. 
If b  is much larger than a , the ability to subsidize application developers 
so as to increase the value of the platform for consumers makes it profitable 
to allow for development. The value increase in the platform becomes 
sufficiently large so as to compensate for the effect of intensified 
competition. These two cases are represented by area 1 in Figure 3. In both 
cases, the firms are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma. They would have been 
better off had they been able to collude in stage 1 on restricting application 
development. 
For intermediate differences in a  and b , it may be that platforms prefer 
to allow development if the rival restricts it and to restrict development if the 
rival allows it. In these cases profit increases from allowing development are 
enough to compensate for intensified competition only if the rival restricts 
development. The reason is that competition is more intense when both 
firms are open to development than if only one firm is open to development. 
Area 3 in Figure 3 contains such parameter combinations, but area 3 also 
contains parameter combinations where the equilibrium is for both firms to 
allow for third party application development. 
Finally, application development costs ( f ) and the intensity of 
competition between platforms (t ) also affect the choice of being open or 
closed to third party application development. Increased development costs 
for applications and decreases in the intensity of competition (increases in 
t ) tend to make restricting development more likely due to diminished 
benefits from cross-group network externalities. This can be seen by noting 
that if  ft  is large and the difference in cross-group externalities small, it is 
more likely that  11 OC CC SS
   and  11 CO OO SS
 !  since it is more likely that 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t    .
  Welfare 
Can restricting third party application development to relax competition 
occur when it would be socially desirable that the platforms are open to third 
party application development? To answer this question we need to 
determine consumer surplus and application developer profits under each 
possible outcome in stage 2.  110     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
Consumer surplus when both firms restrict application development is 
1 5




CC x C S vt xpd x vt x pd xv


           ³³ . Third party 
application providers' profits are zero since they cannot interact with 
consumers. If both platforms allow for application development, consumer 
surplus and application provider profits are 
*
*
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Finally, under the asymmetric outcomes when one firm allows for 
application development and the other restricts development consumer 
surplus and third party developer profits are 
*
*
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  ³ . [24] 
Given these expressions, which of the four possible combinations of 
being open or closed to third party development would maximize social 
welfare? Suppose that social welfare is measured as the sum of consumer 
surplus, firm profits and third party developer profits. Then, it is best for total 
welfare to have both firms allow for development if 
** * * ** *
12 1 12 OO OO OO OO CC CC CC CS CS SS SS  3 ! ,          [25] 
** * * ** * *
12 1 12 OO OO OO OO OC OC OC OC CS CS SS SS  3 !  3 , and      [26] J. TÅG  111
** * * ** * *
12 1 12 OO OO OO OO CO CO CO CO CS CS SS SS  3 !  3 .        [27] 
The first condition always holds since the difference between the left-
hand and right-hand side is 
2 1 (( ) ) 0 f ab ! . The second and third 
conditions are equivalent in this model. It is possible to show that they hold 
for ft  sufficiently large  6. Hence, for sufficiently large  ft , it is socially 
optimal that both platforms allow for third party application development. 
If the firms privately choose between allowing and restricting third party 
application development, each firm will have a dominant strategy to provide 
an open platform if 
**
11 OC CC SS ! ,
**
22 CO CC SS ! ,
**
11 OO CO SS ! , and 
**
22 OO OC SS ! . The first two and the second two conditions are equivalent. 
The first two conditions hold for 
22 2 2 2( 6) 0 ab a a b b f t  ! , which is 
positive for large  ft  only if 
22 60 aa b b  !  or, equivalently, if 
2 () 40 ab a b  ! . Hence, for large  ft  and sufficiently small difference in 
cross group externalities, so that 
2 () 40 ab a b    , firms would not have 
any incentives to allow for third party application development even if it were 
socially desirable.  
Proposition 2: There exist cases where competing platforms restrict third 
party application development in a sub-game perfect equilibrium when total 
welfare would be higher if the firms allowed for third party application 
development.    
The reason for why firms do not have incentives to be open to third party 
application development is that it makes the rival more aggressive in pricing. 
Proposition 2 then suggests that there may be situations in which a policy of 
supporting open platforms is warranted; particularly when firms seem to 
restrict third party application development in order to reduce competition for 
consumers. 
6 The difference between the left-hand and right-hand side can be simplified to 
43 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 2 23 4 2 2 4(17 72 106 72 17 ) 3( ) ( 8 10 8 72 ) aa ba ba bb f t a b a a b a b a b bf t         
which holds for sufficiently large  ft .112     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
  Discussion on extensions 
This stylized model can be extended in several directions. First, it was 
assumed that the market was completely covered on the consumer side. 
This implies that price cuts to consumers by the firms do not attract new 
customers; neither do increases in quality from allowing third party 
application development. Maintaining the assumption of a covered market 
thus biases the results in favor of restricting application development. The 
assumption does not, however, change the fact that competition between 
firms with third party applications is more intense than competition between 
firms that does not have third party applications.  
Second, the current setup does not allow the firms to choose between in-
house application development and outsourcing the development of 
applications to third-parties. I only consider the choice between allowing third 
party application development or not. This is likely to bias the results in favor 
of allowing third party development as this is the only way to increase the 
quality of the product sold.  
Third, it was assumed that there is no cost to the platform for allowing 
third party application development. Introducing a fixed cost for developing 
the capabilities for third party producers to develop applications is not likely 
to change the nature of the results other than increasing the benefit to 
platforms from restricting third party application development. It may also be 
that unauthorized third party application development takes place. In that 
case, opening the platform to third party application development may 
involve cost savings, as costly measures to restrict unauthorized use and 
development of applications no longer need to be undertaken. In this case 
the results would change so that it would be more likely for the platforms to 
be open to third party application development. 
Fourth, it was assumed that third party application developers had to 
incur the fixed cost of developing an application once for each platform. 
Once an application has been developed, however, it is likely that porting it 
to another platform is less expensive than rewriting it completely. Introducing 
this aspect into the model potentially significantly complicates the analysis. 
The reason is that in the current set up, each application developer decides 
on developing for one platform independently of the decision to develop for 
the other. As a consequence, the firms only compete directly for users and 
not for application developers, as the choice to develop for one is 
independent of the choice to develop for the other. If the costs for developing 
an application are conditional on whether the application has previously J. TÅG  113
been developed, development choice becomes interdependent. The likely 
bias of this extension on the results is not clear and hence, is a good 
direction for future research. Existing complementary work on the issue of 
porting in two-sided markets include POLLOCK (2008). 
  Concluding remarks 
Why are some platforms open to third party application development 
while others are closed? In this paper, I take a two-sided market approach 
and highlight that being open to third party development intensifies 
competition for consumers. Hence, firms might prefer to commit to restricting 
development despite the fact that applications are valuable to consumers 
and allowing third party application development is free.  
In a two-stage model of a two-sided market, I find three types of 
equilibrium configurations: both firms allow development (and the firms are 
trapped in a prisoner's dilemma); both firms restrict development; or one firm 
allows development and the other restricts it. The outcome depends on the 
relative difference in cross-group externalities, the intensity of competition for 
consumers and the cost for developing applications.  
The policy implications are that competing platforms may have incentives 
to restrict third party application development even when it is desirable for 
society that they are open to development. In particular, the model suggests 
that private and social incentives to open the platforms diverge when 
consumer transportation costs and application developer fixed costs are 
large, and when there is a small difference in cross group externalities so 
that it is not clear which side values the other more. Under these conditions - 
and if firms provide closed platforms - a policy in support of open platforms 
could be beneficial to society. 
As regards to future research, the model is cast in the framework of 
software and hardware platforms. It could also apply to other two-sided 
markets where choosing between providing a one-sided product or a two-
sided platform is possible. In particular, as a firm can be open or closed to 
advertisers, the analysis could be adapted to study how magazines and TV 
stations are funded along the lines of KIND, NILSSEN & SORGARD (2005).  114     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
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